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A More Perfect (NFL Players) Union:  
Secret “Side Deals,” the NFLPA, and the Duty of Fair 
Representation 
SAM C. EHRLICH* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, the National Football League (NFL) and the 
National Football League Players’ Association (NFLPA) have seemed—at 
least publicly—to be consistently at each other’s throats.  Since the last NFL 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was ratified in 2011, the 
relationship between the two entities has suffered through court battles,1 
arbitration hearings,2 controversially unilateral actions by the NFL without 
NFLPA input,3 and constant fighting in the press between the players and 
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell.4 
Based on recent events, however, it appears that some NFL players 
have found another target for their discontent over the terms of their 
employment: their own union.  In late 2016 to early 2017, Mike Pennel and 
Lane Johnson, two NFL players who tested positive for substances that 
violated the NFL’s Performance-Enhancing Drugs and Substances of Abuse 
policies, sued the NFL based on allegations that their appellate rights were 
violated.5  But notably, these players also sued the NFLPA, claiming that 
 
* Sam C. Ehrlich, J.D., Doctoral Student, Sport Management, Florida State University. 
1.See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 531-
32 (2d Cir. 2016) (examining Tom Brady’s suspension appeal).  See also Alfred C. Yen, The Puzzle of 
Deflategate: Private Agreements and the Possibility of Biased Justice, 16 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 51 
(2016) (also examining “Deflategate”). 
 2. See Matthew Futterman, NFL Withheld Millions from Players, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 23, 
2016, 10:29 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nfl-withheld-millions-from-players-1456189111 (noting 
that the NFL was ordered to return $100 million to the pool of revenue it shares with its players). 
 3. See, e.g., Andrew Brandt, Union Can’t Get a Word In, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://mmqb.si.com/2014/12/09/nflpa-personal-conduct-policy-negotiation (noting that sometimes 
months pass without any communications between the two sides). 
 4. See Matt Bonesteel, Drew Brees says NFL Players ‘Don’t Have any Faith’ in Roger Goodell, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/11/08/drew-
brees-says-nfl-players-dont-have-any-faith-in-roger-goodell/; Andrew Brandt, Rodgers on Roger, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug 24, 2016), http://mmqb.si.com/mmqb/2016/08/24/nfl-aaron-rodgers-green-
bay-packers-roger-goodell-business-of-football; Bob Condotta, Seahawk Richard Sherman Rips Roger 
Goodell, Officiating, says NFL ‘Isn’t Fun Anymore’ — and more,  SEATTLE TIMES (last updated Nov. 
15, 2016, 10:31 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/sports/seahawks/seahawk-richard-sherman-rips-
roger-goodell-officiating-says-nfl-isnt-fun-anymore-and-more/. 
 5. Complaint at 2, Pennel v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 5:16-cv-02889 (N.D. 
Ohio Nov. 29, 2016); Amended Complaint at 17, Johnson v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 
5:17-cv-00047 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2017). 
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the players’ union colluded with the NFL to change the appellate rights they 
are legally entitled to under the terms of the two drug testing policies.6 
These lawsuits have uncovered an interesting twist to the ongoing 
drama between the NFL and the NFLPA: alleged secret “side deals” 
between the two collective bargaining units to modify terms of the two drug 
policies without going through the proper channels to modify the 
agreements.7  These “side deals,” which the NFL and the NFLPA allegedly 
withheld from Johnson and Pennel’s attorneys,8 are apparently neither 
memorialized nor even written down.9 
Based on allegations of these side deals and other allegations of NFLPA 
misconduct, Johnson and Pennel sued not only the NFL, but also the 
NFLPA for a breach of the duty of fair representation.10  Johnson and 
Pennel have claimed that the NFLPA has failed in its duty to adequately 
represent the NFL players that make up its organization by covertly working 
with the league to change the terms of the drug testing policies and keeping 
those changes secret from the players.11  While Pennel settled his lawsuit 
shortly after filing it,12 Johnson’s lawsuit is still ongoing.13 
While a professional athlete’s action to sue his own union is not 
unprecedented,14 proving a breach of the duty of fair representation is 
 
 6. Complaint, supra note 5, at 5; Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 22, 24. 
 7. Transcript of Proceedings at 6-7, Pennel v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 5:16-cv-
02889 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2016). 
 8. See Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 16 (interestingly—though likely not 
coincidentally—the same attorney filed both the Pennel and Johnson lawsuits: Stephen S. Zashin). 
 9. See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 7, at 14 (asking if it had been reduced to writing). 
 10. Complaint, supra note 5; Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 24. 
 11. Complaint, supra note 5, at 7; Amended. Complaint, supra note 5, at 24. 
 12. See Brian Jones, Mike Pennel Settles Appeal, Suspended by NFL, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 6, 2016, 
11:34 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/mike-pennel-settles-appeal-suspended-by-nfl/ 
(reporting that Pennel agreed to drop his lawsuit in exchange for the NFL reducing his suspension from 
ten games to four games). 
 13. See Johnson v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 5:17-CV-0047, 2017 WL 2882119, 
at *4 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (the Johnson case was transferred to the Southern District of New York on July 
6, and is currently pending). 
 14. See Michael McCann, Lane Johnson’s Bold Move to Sue his Own Union is Rare, but not 
Unprecedented, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/01/11/lane-johnson-
suspension-lawsuit-nfl-nflpa-peds (noting various examples of lawsuits filed by both retired and active 
NFL players against the NFLPA).  See, e.g., Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 
1170, 1185 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming a trial court’s order holding that a player’s claims against the 
NFL and NFLPA for providing inaccurate financial advice that led to the player investing in a Ponzi 
scheme were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 
F.2d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming a trial court’s order overturning a jury verdict in favor of a 
player against the NFLPA and two of its lawyers who had provided the player with incorrect advice 
regarding an injury protection clause in his contract); Ballard v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
123 F.Supp.3d 1161, 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (dismissing a group of former players’ lawsuit against the 
NFLPA alleging that the NFLPA’s failure to protect players from the risk of concussions was a breach 
of the duty of fair representation); Boogard v. Nat’l Hockey League Players Ass’n., No. 2:12-cv-9128, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38840, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (dismissing a duty of fair representation by the 
estate of a former professional hockey player based on the union’s failure to file a grievance against the 
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notoriously difficult.  Courts have frequently stated that an “enormous 
burden” is required to prove union liability under this legal theory.15  But at 
the same time, courts have also not looked fondly on so-called “secret 
deals” between employers and unions that take away rights of employees 
both individually and collectively.16  As such, if other instances come up in 
the near future where more players are affected by these side deals, the 
NFLPA may face serious questions and legal battles from its membership 
body. 
Part I of this Article looks at the judge-made duty of fair representation 
doctrine and how it is applied both generally and in the context of 
collectively bargained arbitration hearings.17  Part II of this Article then 
analyzes the Pennel and Johnson lawsuits, and explores the players’ 
allegations of these secret “side deals” that have affected their appellate 
rights under the NFL drug policies.18  Part III of this Article then questions 
the NFLPA’s potential liability for entering into these side deals with the 
NFL and whether the high bar for a breach of fair representation claim can 
be met given both what has been revealed by the Pennel and Johnson cases 
and what may be revealed in the future.19 
 
National Hockey League after the player overdosed on pain medication prescribed by team physicians); 
Chuy v. Nat’l Football League Players’ Ass’n, 495 F. Supp. 137, 139 (E.D. Penn. 1980) (denying the 
plaintiff’s action to collect attorney’s fees from the NFLPA for a successful action against his club-
employer after the NFLPA had refused to take up a grievance on his behalf).  According to one 
commentator, former baseball player Barry Bonds would have had a strong case against the Major 
League Baseball Players Association for a breach of the duty of fair representation if he had sued them 
after he was “blackballed” from the league in the 2007-2008 offseason.  See Anthony Torrente, Baseball 
and the Law: America’s National Pastime: The Dark Side of Professional Baseball: The Fall of Barry 
Bonds, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 352, 354 (2012).  It is also arguable that Maurice Clarett, a football player 
who unsuccessfully attempted to sue the NFL to overturn a restriction barring him from the NFL because 
he had not yet spent at least three years in college, should have sued his union along with the league as 
the union did not defend him even though the age rule in question was at the time not codified in the 
NFL CBA.  See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying the 
nonstatutory labor exemption to bar Clarett’s antitrust claim despite noting that “the eligibility rules do 
not appear in the text of the collective bargaining agreement”).  See also Brando Simeo Starkey, The Veil 
of Fair Representation: Maurice Clarett v. The National Football League, 37 U. BALT. L.F. 17, 35 
(2006); Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 962 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that if collectively 
bargained terms like the draft and salary cap that discriminated against new players were illegal, “the 
proper action would be one for breach of the duty of fair representation,” not antitrust). 
 15. Nicholls v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 05-CV-2666, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14144, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) aff’d 204 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 16. See Rupcich v. UFCW Int’l Union, Local 881, 833 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
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I. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 
A. The Duty of Fair Representation Generally 
“The duty of fair representation is defined by a body of judge-made law 
that has developed around the fiduciary-type duty a union owes the workers 
it serves as bargaining agent.”20  This doctrine serves to “regulate[] union 
conduct in both negotiating and administering the collective bargaining 
agreement” that is jointly agreed upon by labor and management.21  In its 
most basic form, the doctrine serves to ensure that unions “represent all its 
members, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not 
against those whom it represents.”22 
Duty of fair representation actions are also extremely difficult to prove, 
as to show that their union breached the duty of fair representation, 
employees must prove that their union’s actions or omissions are either (1) 
“arbitrary;” (2) “discriminatory;” or (3) “in bad faith.”23  Arbitrary decisions 
by unions are decisions that “arise from caprice or [are] without reason,” 
and are “so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ . . .  as to be 
irrational.”24  Similarly, the duty requires that unions act in a non-
discriminatory way by ensuring that “all its members stand[s] on no 
different footing,”25 and to act in good faith in its dealings with its 
membership body.26 
While unions are said to have a duty to their employees “to represent 
them adequately as well as honestly and in good faith,”27 employees face an 
“enormous burden” to prove a union’s breach of the duty of fair 
representation.28  Employees must show “substantial evidence of fraud, 
deceitful action or dishonest conduct” as “requisite elements” of any duty of 
fair representation claim.29  Further, the employee must show that the 
union’s activities were more than simply a “tactical error” as “negligence on 
 
 20. Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do In Fact, 34 
BUFF. L. REV. 89, 91 (1985). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). 
 23. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).  Only one of these three factors must be proven to 
prove a breach of the duty.  Driver v. U.S. Postal Serv., 328 F.3d 863, 868-69 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 24. Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. 
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) (citation omitted)); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 
1207, 1211 n.3 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 25. Steele, 323 U.S. at 207. 
 26. See Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 46-48 (1998) (holding that the Screen 
Actors Guild did not act in bad faith in negotiating clause). 
 27. O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 75. 
 28. Nicholls, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14144 at *19-20.  See also Dillard v. Seiu Local 32BJ, No. 
15 Civ. 4132, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152502, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 29. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964); Amalgamted Ass’n St., Elec. Ry. & Motor 
Coach Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971). 
4
Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 44 [], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss1/2
2018] A MORE PERFECT (NFL PLAYERS) UNION 37 
 
 
the union’s part does not give rise to a breach” so “long as the union acts in 
good faith.”30 
However, causes of action based on this duty are seen as controversial, 
since suing based on this duty “pits the individual employee against the 
combined forces of the union and the employer.”31  Because a breach of the 
duty is so difficult to prove, an employee’s treatment by his union can easily 
be unfair without being illegal.32  Further, unions claim that defending these 
lawsuits is a needless use of resources that could be used to fight an 
employer’s unfair conduct.33  As such, courts give unions wide deference to 
represent their membership given “the wide latitude that negotiators need 
for the effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities.”34 
B. Potential Liability Regarding Collectively Bargained Arbitration 
Hearings 
In the context of collectively bargained grievance arbitration hearings, 
employees have a high standard to meet to prove that a hearing was 
conducted unfairly.35  Courts have consistently held that when a dispute is 
resolved in accordance with a CBA, judicial review of an arbitration hearing 
is “very limited” and generally restricted to instances where the arbitration 
award was procured by “corruption, fraud, or undue means,” or where the 
arbitrator was impartial, refused to hear material evidence, or exceeded his 
power as granted by the CBA.36 
Similarly, the bar for a union breach of the duty of fair representation in 
the context of arbitration hearings is set extremely high.37  In a recent 
Second Circuit decision involving an alleged breach of the duty of fair 
representation in regards to an arbitration hearing, a musician for the 
Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra contended that his union inadequately 
represented him during an arbitration hearing with his employer by failing 
 
 30. Barr v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 868 F.2d 36, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1989); Cook v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, Inc., 771 F.2d 635, 645 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Capobianco v. Brink’s, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 971, 
975 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 31. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 92. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 78. 
 35. See Roy v. Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra Soc’y, 682 F.App’x 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(“Except where fundamental fairness is violated, arbitration determinations will not be opened up to 
evidentiary review.”) (quoting LJL 33rd St. Assocs., LLC v. Pitcairn Props. Inc., 725 F.3d 184, 195 (2d 
Cir. 2013)). 
 36. Id. at 44.  Such guidelines are procured from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which 
federal courts look to as a set of guidelines in labor arbitration hearings even though it “does not apply to 
arbitrations conducted pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act.” Id.  See also Nat’l Football 
League Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 545 n.13. 
 37. Roy, 682 F.App’x at 46-47. 
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to “‘properly cross-examine . . . witnesses, raise objections and introduce 
evidence’” in the arbitration hearing.38  However, the court found that these 
claims did not “come close to demonstrating improper intent, purpose, or 
motive, or egregious behavior” and were instead merely at worst “‘[t]actical 
errors [which] are insufficient to show a breach of the duty of fair 
representation.’”39 
Normally, where grievance procedures exist in collective bargaining 
agreements, employees heard under this procedure are bound by the results 
of the grievance hearing even if the hearing is lost due to poor judgment by 
union officials.40  An exception to this general rule applies only when a 
worker can prove that his or her union breached its duty of fair 
representation by not acting “with complete good faith and honesty, and to 
avoid arbitrary conduct.”41  Such claims would even survive preemption by 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as the duty of fair representation 
exists “as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals 
stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor 
law.”42 
Even a union’s decision not to take an employee’s grievance to 
arbitration at all may not constitute a breach of its duty of fair 
representation, as the duty requires the union only to “undertake a 
reasonable investigation to defend a union member, . . . not an error-free 
one.”43  Unions are given wide discretion in deciding whether to even 
arbitrate a grievance and are allowed the ability to “act according to [their] 
own reasonable interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.”44  
The key question is whether the union’s decisions were “irrational,” as 
“‘mere negligence or poor judgment’ alone is not sufficient to prove breach 
of duty.”45 
Matters become complicated when an employee chooses to file a 
“hybrid” action where the employee claims a breach of the duty of fair 
representation against the union while also seeking vacatur of an arbitration 
award under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).46  The 
courts have held that in such hybrid actions, the employee is tasked with 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 47; see Barr, 868 F.2d at 43. 
 40. See Goldberg, supra note 20; Vaca, 386 U.S.at 184. 
 41. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177 (citing Humphrey, 375 U.S. at 342). 
 42. Id. at 182. 
 43. Blesedell v. Chillicothe Tel. Co., 811 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 44. Landry v. The Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 880 F.2d 846, 854 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 45. Blesedell, 811 F.3d at 221 (citing Danton v. Brighton Hosp., 335 F.App’x 580, 586 (6th Cir. 
2009)). 
 46. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1947).  For an example of a hybrid action in the sports law context see 
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001). 
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proving that the union breached its duty of fair representation and that the 
arbitration was handled improperly; if one action fails, the employee 
“cannot succeed against either party.”47 
However, there is judicial precedent showing that unions can be found 
liable for mishandling arbitration proceedings under certain scenarios.  For 
example, in Allen v. Allied Plant Maintenance Co. of Tennessee,48 the Sixth 
Circuit found that a union’s actions in conspiring with the employer to get a 
biased arbitrator on an arbitration panel would constitute a breach of the 
duty of fair representation.49 
More recently, the Seventh Circuit held in Rupcich v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 881,50 that a union that ignores the 
“plain text” of a collectively bargained agreement in a way that alters an 
employee’s “fundamental rights” could be found to have acted in an 
arbitrary fashion in representing that employee.51  In this case, a union chose 
not to pursue or even settle a grievance filed by a fired employee despite the 
relevant CBA stating that the union “shall” take certain steps when an 
employer files a grievance.52 
During oral argument in Rupcich at the Seventh Circuit, the union’s 
attorney conceded that the union did not feel they needed to follow the 
grievance procedure due to the union and employer’s “‘long-standing 
practice of bypassing Step 1 in cases of termination.’”53  The court found 
that this “side-arrangement” between the union and the employer, which 
according to the Seventh Circuit “purports to remove contractual avenues of 
review for grievances at the Union’s whim,” is an action that “is contrary to 
‘national labor policy’ and ‘unenforceable as a matter of law.’”54  As such, 
the Seventh Circuit found that the reliance on this side agreement in 
deciding not to take up the employee’s grievance could be found by a jury 
to be irrational.55 
 
 47. See Bagsby v. Lewis Bros. Inc. of Tenn., 820 F.2d 799, 801 (6th Cir. 1987) (so long as the 
claims against the employer and union are interdependent, as they usually are); see also White v. Anchor 
Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 48. 881 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 49. Id. at 296-97. 
 50. 833 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 51. Id. at 855. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 855-56 (citing Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div. of Jewel Cos., Inc., 945 F.2d 889, 
894 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also Lewis v. Tuscan Dairy Farms, Inc., 25 F.3d 1138, 1140, 1143 (2d Cir. 
1994) (finding that a union’s “secret agreement” with the employer that modified the employees’ 
seniority rights following a merger was a breach of the duty of fair representation as any modification to 
the CBA required “meeting with Union membership to discuss demands, approval by the Union’s Joint 
Council and Area Conference before submission to the employer and . . . ratification by vote of the 
membership” as per the union’s bylaws). 
 55. Rupcich, 833 F.3d at 856. 
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II. PENNEL AND JOHNSON’S CLAIMS AGAINST THE NFLPA 
The issue of the duty of fair representation is particularly meaningful in 
the sports context right now due to two recently filed hybrid § 301/DFR 
cases by NFL players against both the NFL and the NFLPA in relation to 
arbitration hearings for drug testing appeals.56  In both cases, NFL players 
have alleged that the NFLPA has breached its duty of fair representation by 
improperly colluding with the NFL in secret “side deals” to change items of 
the NFL drug testing policies related to the players’ rights to appeal positive 
tests and suspensions.57 
In the first of these cases, Green Bay Packers defensive lineman Mike 
Pennel received a letter from the NFL on November 8, 2016 informing him 
that he faced discipline for violating the NFL’s substance abuse policy for 
testing positive for banned drugs.58  As this was Pennel’s second offense, he 
faced a ten game suspension pending his appeal.59  Pennel then sued the 
NFL and NFLPA in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio, alleging that the NFL and the NFLPA “failed to abide by 
the arbitrator selection and assignment provisions and procedure set forth in 
the” NFL Drug Policy Arbitration Agreement.60 
Section 4.1 of the NFL’s Policy and Program on Substances of Abuse 
requires that the NFL and the NFLPA “jointly select . . . no fewer than three 
but no more than five arbitrators to act as hearing officers for appeals” of 
prescribed disciplinary action under the drug policy.61  This group of 
arbitrators would then “designate one of its members to. .  be responsible for 
assignment of appeals.”62  That “Notice Arbitrator” would then schedule 
each of the other members to be available during each Tuesday during the 
playing season,63 and a player’s appeal would be heard by that one arbitrator 
barring any objections based on neutrality.64 
But according to the complaint, Pennel was informed by the NFL 
Management Council that only two arbitrators were available to hear 
appeals.65  In light of this discrepancy, Pennel asked the court to enjoin the 
NFL and the NFLPA from proceeding with the appeal hearing and appoint a 
 
 56. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 2-3; Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 38. 
 57. See Transcript, supra note 7, at 6-8; Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 24-25, 45-46. 
 58. Eric Heisig, Green Bay Packers Defensive Tackle Sues NFL over Substance Abuse Discipline 
Appeal, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Nov. 29, 2016), 
http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2016/11/green_bay_packers_defensive_en.html. 
 59. Jones, supra note 12. 
 60. Complaint, supra note 5. 
 61. Id. at 4. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Transcript, supra note 7, at 27. 
 65. Complaint, supra note 5, at 5. 
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third arbitrator to the panel under the guidelines of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA).66  Pennel claimed that this “lapse in express provisions of the 
[drug] Policy regarding the method of naming and appointing an arbitrator” 
for his appeal constituted a breach of the duty of fair representation by the 
NFLPA in regards to its handling of his arbitration hearing.67 
Interestingly, in a hearing for this case by telephone, Pennel’s attorney 
Stephen S. Zashin claimed that according to position papers submitted by 
the NFL and the NFLPA, there are various “side agreements or side deals” 
regarding the drug policy “that were apparently agreed upon but never 
provided to any of the players in this particular case.”68  These “side deals” 
apparently included “modifications to the substances of abuse policy, which 
deal directly with the issues concerning Mr. Pennel that are specifically 
identified in the policy.”69  When Zashin asked for “information relative to 
those side deals” as part of issued discovery, the NFL and NFLPA refused 
to hand over that information.70  Zashin also claimed that the NFLPA 
“refused in virtual totality to provide Mr. Pennel with any information 
relative to his defense in this particular proceeding” and that any complaint 
Pennel raised to NFLPA staff fell “on deaf ears.”71 
In this hearing, NFLPA attorney David L. Greenspan defended the 
union by stating that the NFL and the NFLPA by mutual consent 
“determined that two arbitrators were sufficient to do the work of hearing 
these drug policy appeals” in light of the small amount of drug policy 
appeals actually prosecuted.72  However, Greenspan could not answer 
whether this modification was actually written down, and stated that he did 
not know whether the modification had been raised to the NFLPA board of 
player representatives for approval.73  Greenspan also argued that the 
production of evidence regarding these “side deals” would be barred by the 
drug policy, which states that “a player is not entitled to production of or 
access to records, reports or other information concerning other players or 
the policy’s bargaining history” in presenting an appeal.74 
Responding to Greenspan’s testimony, the presiding judge, Judge John 
R. Adams, expressed deep concern about the lack of a formalized agreement 
given the “implications for a player” and his “right to a fair hearing.”75  He 
 
 66. Id. at 7. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Transcript, supra note 7. 
 69. Id. at 7. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 10. 
 72. Id. at 13. 
 73. Transcript, supra note 7, at 14. 
 74. Id. at 34. 
 75. Id. at 16. 
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stated that the NFLPA was essentially arguing that it and the NFL had 
“basically come to some other agreement that we will not follow the plain 
language of our agreement.”76  In the end, Judge Adams summed up the 
NFL and NFLPA’s arguments in the hearing as: “[We] have an agreement 
that says that these are the terms of the agreement.  They’re valid and 
they’re binding, but we can modify the agreement and we don’t have to 
disclose the modification to anyone essentially.”77 
Judge Adams said that this argument struck him as “almost a lack of 
fundamental fairness” that “cries out for some sort of hearing.”78  Judge 
Adams then ruled that barring a mutual agreement to a continuance, he 
would schedule a hearing for the following Monday on the request for a 
temporary restraining order and allow Pennel limited discovery on the 
issue.79 
This hearing never happened, as the NFL settled with Pennel shortly 
after this telephone hearing, agreeing to drop Pennel’s suspension from ten 
games to four games.80  But just one month later, Philadelphia Eagles 
offensive tackle Lane Johnson sued the NFL and the NFLPA to vacate an 
arbitration award confirming Johnson’s 10-game suspension for violating 
the NFL Policy on Performance-Enhancing Substances.81 
Johnson—again represented by Stephen S. Zashin—argued many of the 
same points as Pennel, claiming that the NFL and the NFLPA had failed to 
provide information about arbitrator selection and other procedural matters 
regarding the arbitration hearing.82  Like Pennel, Johnson claimed that only 
two arbitrators were assigned to hear appeals, which contradicted the 
written terms of not only the substance abuse policy, but also the Policy on 
Performance-Enhancing Drugs.83  He also claimed that the arbitrator 
assigned to hear his case “refused to provide Johnson with basic information 
necessary to assert his defense,” and that when the arbitrator did order the 
NFL to produce “any other testing laboratory ‘protocols’ referenced in the 
Policy . . . that were applicable to the testing of samples such as the testing 
 
 76. Id. at 31. 
 77. Id. at 37. 
 78. Transcript, supra note 7, at 37-38. 
 79. Id. at 38, 41. 
 80. Jones, supra note 12. 
 81. Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 55.  While Johnson already served most of his 
suspension at the time his lawsuit was filed, the lawsuit was filed in part to “recoup money Johnson has 
lost during his suspension, reinstate the future guaranteed money in Johnson’s contract that was voided 
by his suspension and to repair Johnson’s reputation.” Josh Paunil, Eagles Wake-Up Call: Inside Lane 
Johnson’s Lawsuit, PHILA. MAG. 
(Nov. 30, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/birds247/2016/11/30/philadelphia-eagles-lane-
johnson-lawsuit-nfl-nflpa-suspension-steve-zashin/#4W2Pt58pUvbxv6k7.99. 
 82. Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 16. 
 83. Id. at 30. 
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that was done of the sample provided by Johnson,” the NFL refused to 
provide that information.84 
Just as Pennel did in his earlier suit, Johnson sued not only the NFL but 
also the NFLPA for a breach of the duty of fair representation.85  Johnson’s 
suit picked up where Pennel left off, claiming that the NFLPA entered into 
“side deals” with the NFL that were “substantive and material deviation[s]” 
from the performance-enhancing drug testing policy under which Johnson 
was suspended.86  Johnson, like Pennel, claimed that when he asked the 
NFL to see the details of these side agreements, the NFL either blankly 
refused to turn over this information or told him to get the information from 
the NFLPA, who then told him to get the information from the NFL.87 
However, Johnson added additional information regarding more of 
these “side deals,” focusing not just on the methods by which arbitrators 
were selected, but also alleging other variations from the policy 
“[e]liminating or effectively eliminating” the Chief Forensic Toxicologist 
(CFT) position required by the terms of the policy, and “[r]edefining the 
period of time a player can be kept in the reasonable cause testing 
program.”88  Johnson claimed that the NFLPA failed to “enter into a writing 
to memorialize the deviations from the express terms of the 2015 Policy, or 
even notify its membership of the deviations,” which according to Johnson, 
would be a violation of Section 6.05 of the NFLPA Constitution.89 
Johnson followed up with additional information about these side 
agreements in his brief opposing the NFLPA’s motion to dismiss the duty of 
fair representation claim.90  In a table claiming to “trace[] the NFLPA’s 
misconduct to Johnson’s injuries,” Johnson argued that the NFLPA refused 
to provide evidence of a side agreement to change the CFT, who is 
responsible for certifying all of the positive test results.91  According to 
Johnson, the CFT identified in Appendix B of the Policy, Dr. Bryan Finkle, 
retired about one year before Johnson’s positive test, which allegedly left 
the drug testing program without a CFT at the time of Johnson’s drug test 
on July 12, 2016.92 
 
 84. Id. at 17. 
 85. Id. at 1. 
 86. Id. at 24-25. 
 87. Paunil, supra note 81. 
 88. Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 25. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss & Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss at 5, Johnson v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
No. 17-cv-00047 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Memorandum]. 
 91. Id. at 4-5.  The parties each do have the power to discharge and replace the CFT “provided 
that written notice is given by the discharging party one year prior to discharge.”  NFL POLICY ON 
PERFORMANCE ENHANCING DRUGS § 2.2 (2015) [hereinafter NFL PES]. 
 92. Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 11, 22. 
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The NFLPA later provided a May 7, 2015 letter from the NFL 
memorializing an agreement for the Directors of the University of 
California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Olympic Analytical Laboratory and the 
Sports Medicine Research and Testing Laboratory to fulfill some, but not 
all, of the CFT’s responsibilities until a new CFT was to be named.93  No 
evidence exists that the NFL or the NFLPA ever found a replacement CFT; 
in fact, it is possible that the position was simply eliminated in a side deal 
between the league and the union.94 
On July 6, 2017, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio granted the NFL and the NFLPA’s motion to transfer the 
case to the Southern District of New York, while denying their respective 
motions to dismiss without prejudice.95  In doing so, the court chose “to 
address solely the issue of transfer,” with the parties free to raise or renew 
the other motions on the docket—including the motions to dismiss— “if 
permitted by the transferee court.”96  In early August 2017, the Southern 
District of New York denied all pending motions and scheduled a case 
 
 93. Letter from Adolpho A. Birch III, Sr. Vice President of Labor Policy & League Affairs, NFL 
Management Council, to Tom DePaso, General Counsel, NFL Players Association (May. 7, 2015) (on 
file with author).  This letter indicates that the UCLA laboratory would “1) review and certify laboratory 
results, . . . 2) certify the results of ‘B’ sample analyses . . . and 3) verify analytical findings provided by 
the testing laboratories,” but that “all other responsibilities of the [CFT] as set forth in the Policy shall 
not be in effect.” Id. This would presumably cover Johnson’s claim to this effect. Id.  Other roles of the 
CFT presumably left unfilled included the responsibilities to: (1) “audit the operation of the testing 
laboratories, including the implementation of procedures, laboratory analysis of specimens and 
documentation;” (2) “consult with the Independent Administrator and Collection Vendor as 
appropriate;” and (3) “provide advice and consultation to the Parties in connection with other matters 
including existing and proposed analytical methods and anti-doping research.”  Id. 
 94. McCann, supra note 14. 
 95. Johnson, 2017 WL 2882119, at *4.  As rationale for the change of venues, the court cited the 
dramatic events of NFLPA v. NFL, where both the NFL and NFLPA raced to the Southern District of 
New York and the District of Minnesota to file their Deflategate-related lawsuits. Id. at *3.  In that case, 
the Minnesota court transferred the case to the Southern District of New York sua sponte, having seen 
“little reason for this action to have been commenced in Minnesota at all,” since the player involved 
(Tom Brady) “plays for a team in Massachusetts; the Union is headquartered in Washington, D.C.; the 
NFL is headquartered in New York; the arbitration proceedings took place in New York; and the award 
was issued in New York.” Id. at *2. The NFLPA’s filing in Minnesota likely related to their string of 
collective bargaining-related victories in that venue, including the union’s victory in convincing the 
court to overturn Minnesota Vikings’ running back Adrian Peterson’s suspension just five months 
earlier.  See Nat’l Football League Player’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League, 88 F.Supp.3d 1084, 1091-92 
(D. Minn. 2015), rev’d, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016) (vacating Peterson’s arbitration award on the 
grounds that a newly enacted domestic violence policy could not apply retroactively to give the 
Commissioner the power to punish Peterson for past offenses); Mike Florio, Minnesota Judge “Strongly 
Suspects” NFLPA was Forum Shopping, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Jul. 30, 2015, 3:59 PM), 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/07/30/minnesota-judge-strongly-suspects-nflpa-was-forum-
shopping/. 
 96. Johnson, 2017 WL 2882119, at *1 n. 1. 
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management conference, where the NFLPA would be allowed to file a new 
motion to dismiss.97 
III. POTENTIAL NFLPA LIABILITY 
NFL players like Johnson and Pennel, who look to sue their own union, 
undoubtedly face significant difficulty in trying to prove that the NFLPA 
breached their duty of fair representation.98  As stated earlier, plaintiffs 
seeking to prove a breach of this duty have an “enormous burden” to show 
that their union’s conduct was either (1) arbitrary; (2) discriminatory; or (3) 
in bad faith where mere “negligence on the union’s part does not give rise to 
a breach.”99  Showing that the union breached its duty of fair representation 
becomes even harder in the context of arbitration hearings—like the appeals 
faced by both Johnson and Pennel—as the union must only show that its 
handling of the arbitration hearing was “reasonable,” not “error-free.”100 
However, the existence of these side deals could spell trouble for the 
NFLPA.  Based on the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Rupcich, side 
agreements that contradict the “plain text” of a collectively bargained 
agreement in a way that “alters an employee’s fundamental rights” can be 
found to be sufficiently arbitrary to show a breach of the duty of fair 
representation despite the “considerable discretion” afforded to unions in 
their handling of grievance matters.101 
Based on both Johnson and Pennel’s pleading documents, the NFL and 
the NFLPA have entered into such side agreements that have modified—at 
minimum—collectively bargained provisions regarding arbitrator selection, 
 
 97. See Order, Johnson v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No 17-cv-5131 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
1, 2017) (denying Plaintiff’s Refiled Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award Under the Federal Arbitration 
Act, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Comply With Initial Standing Order, & Defendant’s 
Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Reply In Support Of the Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award & scheduling 
initial conference); see also NFLPA Letter Motion for Conference for Permission to Move to Dismiss at 
1, 3 Johnson v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 17-cv-5131 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017) 
(requesting a pre-motion conference and permission to move to dismiss); id. at 3 (granting the Motion).  
Leading up to this order, the parties were instructed to file a joint letter addressing the status of the case 
to date and what motions were still pending before the court.  See generally Letter from Stephen S. 
Zashin, Jeffrey L. Kessler, & Daniel L. Nash to Judge Richard J. Sullivan (Jul. 28, 2017).  This letter 
contained the interesting factoid that in April 2017, Johnson made a written settlement demand to the 
NFL and NFLPA, which was rejected by both parties. Id. at 4.  According to this letter, the NFL, “does 
not believe this is an appropriate case for settlement.” Id. This is somewhat in contrast to the Pennel 
case, which was settled just one week after the case was filed.  See Jones, supra note 12 (the difference is 
likely due to the fact that Johnson has already served his suspension and is seeking money damages, 
while Pennel was still in the process of appealing his suspension). 
 98. See McCann, supra note 14 (noting that it is an uphill battle to prove this claim). 
 99. See Barr, 868 F.2d at 44-45; Cook, 771 F.2d at 645 (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190). 
 100. Blesedell, 811 F.3d at 220. 
 101. Rupcich, 833 F.3d at 855. 
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verification and certification of testing results, and controls over testing 
facilities.102 
But perhaps the most important part here is that these agreements were 
allegedly kept from both Johnson and Pennel by the union and the league.103  
Side deals to modify collectively bargained terms are not inherently bad or 
illegal, and collectively bargained agreements do not have to be in writing 
and may even be modified orally regardless of whether the agreement is in 
writing.104  At the same time, this deference towards collective bargaining 
rights tends to stop when oral modifications to a collective bargaining 
agreement are done in secret by unions and employers.  Regardless of the 
innocence of the terms of the side deals, Rupcich—and Judge John R. 
Adams’s reaction to finding out about the NFL and the NFLPA side deals in 
the Pennel hearing105—indicates the great distain that courts generally show 
towards these secret agreements.106 
Indeed, Judge Adams’s reaction is supported by decades of precedent.  
Even beyond Rupcich, several courts have refused to enforce secret oral 
side agreements that “undermine the written collective bargaining 
 
 102. See Transcript, supra note 7; Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 49. 
 103. See Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at 49. 
 104. See U.S. Soccer Fed’n., Inc. v. U.S. Women’s Nat’l Soccer Team Players Ass’n, 190 
F.Supp.3d 777, 785 (E.D. Ill. 2016) (“[A] collective bargaining agreement may be partly or wholly oral 
and a written collective bargaining agreement may be orally modified”).  In one of the more famous 
instances of a collectively bargained side deal in sports; examining the rule challenged in Clarett which 
required football players to spend three years in college before becoming eligible for the NFL draft was 
held to be exempt from antitrust laws despite not at the time appearing in the text of the NFL CBA).  
“Although the eligibility rules do not appear in the text of the collective bargaining agreement, the NFL 
Constitution and Bylaws that at the time of the agreement’s adoption contained the eligibility rules are 
mentioned in three separate provisions relevant to our discussion.” Clarett, 369 F.3d at 127.  In that 
action, the NFLPA—in an amicus brief that in large part supported the NFL against Clarett—the NFLPA 
stated that the union had “agreed to waive its right to bargain over, and agreed not to sue over, certain 
provisions of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws in effect as of that time,” and the was included in these 
provisions as “identified in a contemporaneous side letter between the NFLPA and the NFL.” Id. This 
side letter was not included with the amicus brief and the other “certain provisions of the NFL 
Constitution and Bylaws” that the union agreed to not sue over are unknown. Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n at 3, Clarett, 369 F. 3d 124 (2d Cir. Apr. 16, 2004).  For more 
discussion on the NFLPA’s amicus brief in Clarett and its own ethereal CBA modification, see Sam C. 
Ehrlich, Clarett’s Shadow: How a 14-Year-Old Case Will Impact NBA Age Rule Bargaining, 19 TEX. 
REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. (forthcoming 2018). 
 105. Transcript, supra note 7, at 31. 
 106. See generally Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Articles: Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2017).  The most obvious policy rationale behind the courts’ uneasiness 
about secret side deals to change collectively bargained appellate procedure is that it creates a type of 
“ad hoc” procedure that leads to questions about the fairness and neutral nature of the proceedings at 
hand.  Id. at 176.  If evidence exists that the NFL and NFLPA have entered into secret side deals that 
modify even innocent terms of the appellate procedure contained in the drug policies, it is not a stretch to 
consider that other side deals may secretly exist—or at least could be made—that create this sort of “ad 
hoc” procedure that may, in a sense, predetermine outcomes for certain players. See id. (noting that “ad 
hoc” procedure presents a deep challenge). 
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agreement” on the basis of public policy.107  In Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox,108 
the Sixth Circuit adopted verbatim a labor law variation of the parol 
evidence rule created by the District Court of the Eastern District of 
Kentucky that excludes evidence of an oral agreement that contradicts the 
terms of a written collective bargaining agreement.109 
Nearly fifty years later, the Seventh Circuit held to this precedent in 
Merk, holding that “collective bargaining agreements must be more secure 
than garden variety contracts” and thus “national labor policy forbids 
introduction of prior or contemporaneous secret agreements to contradict 
fundamental terms of a ratified collective bargaining contract.”110  Indeed, 
the Seventh Circuit noted that the union’s “deliberate policy of secrecy” was 
“crucial to [the court’s] analysis” of facts that “clearly illuminate the grave 
dangers posed by a backroom deal that is secretly negotiated between union 
officials and company management without the knowledge or consent of the 
union rank and file.”111 
In Local 509, Missouri-Kansas-Nebraska-Oklahoma District Council, 
Int’l Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Annshire Garment Co.,112 the 
United States District Court for the District of Kansas refused to enforce an 
oral side agreement to a collective bargaining agreement, stating: 
The Court cannot improve upon the views announced in Gatliff 
Coal Co. v. Cox . . . for the application of a national labor policy to 
insulate written collective bargaining agreements from the sham or 
oral side agreement attack.  To be sure, there are two possible evils 
 
 107. See Merk, 945 F.2d at 894; see also Lewis, 25 F.3d at 1143 (affirming an award for $5.3 
million against a union and employer who reached a secret agreement that resulted in a change to the 
employees’ seniority rights under the CBA without taking “steps to obtain a proper modification” as 
required by union bylaws). 
 108. 152 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1945). 
 109. See Id. at 53-56; see also Int’l. Union. v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 
1983) (holding that while interpreting terms in a collective bargaining agreement, “the court should 
review the interpretation ultimately derived from its examination of the language, context and other 
indicia of intent for consistency with federal labor policy.”). 
 110. Merk, 945 F.2d at 894.  The Seventh Circuit sharply criticized the district court opinion 
(written by Judge Richard A. Posner sitting by designation) granting summary judgment for the 
employer and union, stating that the district court, by “[i]gnoring a long line of precedent . . . allowed 
introduction of the oral reopener to vary the terms of the written CBA.” Id. at 895.  Notably for the 
purposes of this Article, the Seventh Circuit focused heavily on the secrecy of the side deal, mentioning 
that neither party “dispute[d] that the oral reopener was, at the behest of Union officials, deliberately 
concealed from the union membership” and holding that the “real danger” posed by the secret agreement 
in question “stems from its secrecy and not simply from its oral character.” Id. The Seventh Circuit also 
noted that in a precursor to the litigation in front of them, the district court threw out a counterclaim by 
the employer alleging that the union breached the oral side agreement under the labor variation of the 
parol evidence rule, ruling that the rule “is particularly important in the context of labor relations, lest 
union leaders engage in side agreements unknown to the rank and file membership.” Id. 
 111. Id. at 896, 899. 
 112. 65 L.R.R.M. 2769 (D. Kan. 1967). 
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to consider in connection with such a national labor policy. One is 
the overzealous or unprincipled union negotiator who will induce a 
management signature to a collective bargaining agreement with 
side assurances that management will not have to comply with 
certain controverted provisions.  The other is management who will 
avoid certain obligations required by the executed collective 
bargaining agreement and attempt to justify such action by an 
alleged oral side agreement that compliance will not be required 
notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous requirement of the 
written collective bargaining agreement.  To suppress industrial 
strife based on this type of controversy national labor policy 
requires that the clear and unambiguous requirements of the written 
collective bargaining agreement be immune from attack found on a 
covert side agreement.113 
While alone a Kansas district court’s opinion may not carry much 
precedential weight in the Southern District of New York, this specific 
language has been cited by the Seventh Circuit,114 the National Labor 
Relations Board,115 and twice by the Supreme Court of Washington.116 
However, there are a few factors that may make the NFLPA’s actions 
regarding Pennel and Johnson distinguishable from this precedent.  First, as 
the NFLPA pointed out in their reply brief supporting their motion to 
dismiss the Johnson case, while Johnson cited Section 6.05 of the NFLPA 
Constitution “about amendments to collectively bargained agreements being 
presented to the Board of Player Representatives for a vote” in his 
opposition brief, “he omit[ted] the rest of 6.05,” which states in relevant 
part: 
Nothing in this Section or in this Constitution shall prohibit the 
Executive Director, in consultation with the President, from 
entering into side letters and/or other documents, including the 
 
 113. Id. at 2772.  The court also noted that a similar labor law variation of the parol evidence rule 
has been applied in the Fourth Circuit, Third Circuit, and “several” district courts. See Lewis v. Lowry, 
322 F.2d 453, 456 (4th Cir. 1963); Lewis v. Mears, 297 F.2d 101, 105 (3rd Cir. 1962); Lewis v. Young 
& Perkins Coal Co., 190 F. Supp. 838, 841 (W.D. Ky. 1960); Lewis v. Coleman, 257 F. Supp. 38, 45 
(S.D.W. Va. 1966); see also Tuscan Dairy Farms, Inc., 25 F.3d at 1143.  It should be noted that to the 
author’s knowledge, it is possible for plaintiffs to win with this type of claim even if the lead plaintiff’s 
last name is not Lewis. 
 114. Merk, 945 F.2d at 894-95. 
 115. See Local 86, Brotherhood of Painters, 216 N.L.R.B. 1127, 1129 n.6 (1975); see also N.D.K. 
Corp., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 1 (1986).  “The National labor policy requires that evidence of oral 
agreements be unavailing to vary the provisions of a written collective-bargaining agreement valid on its 
face.”  Id. 
 116. See Rest. Emps. et al. v. Morris Rhodes et al., 580 P.2d 611, 614 (Wash. 1978); Retail Clerks 
Health & Welfare Trust Funds v. Shopland Supermarket, Inc., 640 P.2d 1051, 1056 (Wash. 1982). 
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resolution of grievances, which clarify or interpret the provisions of 
any existing Collective Bargaining Agreement or are necessary for 
the orderly implementation and administration of a Collective 
Bargaining Agreement.117 
Given these terms, it would seem that entering into these side 
agreements is not a violation of the NFLPA Constitution so long as the side 
agreements are to “clarify or interpret” the CBA “or are necessary for the 
orderly implementation and administration of” the CBA.118 
But the words “clarify or interpret” are key terms here.119  When the 
NFL and the NFLPA enter into agreements to directly change terms of 
collectively bargained agreements, like the drug policies, are those 
agreements serving to “clarify or interpret” the policies, or outright 
changing the terms of the policies?120  The words “clarify” and “interpret” 
are limited; a judge or jury could reasonably see these expressions as only 
granting the parties the ability to enter agreements to resolve ambiguities in 
the language of the policy, rather than giving the power to outright change 
the plain language of the policies’ terms.  For instance, while a change from 
three arbitrators to two may be a relatively inconsequential change given the 
scope of the entire policy, the three arbitrator clause is unambiguous and the 
change made in the context of the side letters could not be seen as merely 
“clarifying” or “interpreting” the CBA’s preexisting terms. 
Further, while the NFL Substance Abuse Policy states that modification 
requires only “the mutual consent of the Parties,”121 the NFL Policy on 
Performance-Enhancing Substances contains no modification clause.122  
 
 117. See Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 7 n.10, 
Johnson v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 5:17-cv-00047 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2017); 2007 
NFL CONST. art. VI, § 6.05. 
 118. 2007 NFL CONST. art. VI, § 6.05. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Crafts v. General Motors Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 310, 319-20 (D.C. Del. 2002) (finding 
that a “Clarification Agreement” entered into by the union and employer “did not merely clarify” the 
terms of the CBA because it “was a departure” from the “well-known meaning” of the changed terms, 
but finding that the union’s right to make side agreements that changed collectively bargained terms was 
preserved by a clause in the Local Agreement that empowered the parties “to make mutually satisfactory 
modifications, additions, deletions, or waivers”) (emphasis added).  Limited case law exists in the labor 
law sphere for interpreting such a provision, but courts’ treatment of the words “clarify” and “interpret” 
in administrative law may offer a clue as to how a court would view this clause. Id.  According to the 
Fourth Circuit, “when an amendment alters, even ‘significantly alters,’ the original statutory language, 
this does ‘not necessarily’ indicate that the amendment institutes a change in the law.”  Brown v. 
Thompson, 374 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 
1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999)).  At the same time, courts “look[] to statements of intent” made by the 
crafters of the statutory language to determine “whether an amendment clarifies or changes an existing 
law.” Id. 
 121. 2016 NFL Substance Abuse Policy, § 1.1.8. 
 122. See 2016 NFL PES (noting that there is no modification clause). 
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Contradictory, the NFL’s CBA specifically states that the “Agreement may 
not be changed, altered, or amended other than by a written agreement 
signed by authorized representatives of the parties.”123  Since the Policy on 
Performance-Enhancing Drugs does not contain a modification clause, and 
the modification clause in the Substance Abuse Policy is ambiguous, the 
courts will likely treat these agreements as part of the CBA.  Where the 
modification terms are ambiguous (the Substance Abuse Policy) or non-
existent (the Policy on Performance-Enhancing Drug), courts will simply 
defer to the terms of the CBA to explain the intent of the parties.124  Since 
the CBA explicitly requires written modifications, and if this is the case, the 
NFLPA may have breached the “plain text” of the CBA by entering into 
these oral side agreements with the NFL to change the terms of either drug 
policy.125 
In response, the NFLPA would likely point to the rule established by 
the Seventh Circuit in Merk and Rupcich, which established that only the 
side deals that alter an employee’s “fundamental rights” are the type of 
deals that are “contrary to ‘national labor policy’ and ‘unenforceable as a 
matter of law.’”126  In contrast to Rupcich, where the union’s side deal with 
the employer took away her grievance rights in totality, the side deals 
alleged by Pennel and Johnson merely alter the players’ grievance rights in 
a fairly insignificant fashion.127  While both the Substance Abuse Policy and 
the Policy on Performance-Enhancing Drugs require three to five arbitrators 
to be available to hear an appeal,128 only one arbitrator is necessary as only 
one arbitrator actually hears each appeal.129  While only having one or two 
 
 123. 2011 NFL CBA art. 70, § 9 (emphasis added). 
 124. See Int’l. Union, 716 F.2d at 1480 (“Where ambiguities exist, the court may look to other 
words and phrases in the collective bargaining agreement for guidance.”); see also United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. Gen. Steel Indus., Inc., 499 F.2d 215, 219 (8th Cir. 1974) (ruling that separately bargained 
insurance, pension, and supplemental insurance benefit plans were governed by the arbitration 
agreements in the basic agreement because they were referred to in the basic agreement).  The NFL CBA 
refers to the Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances (the prior name for the Policy on 
Performance-Enhancing Drugs) and the Policy and Program on Substances of Abuse in Art. 4 § 9(e), 
Art. 39 § 7(b), Art. 42 § 6, and Art. 51 § 1.   2011 NFL CBA art. 4, § 9(e); id. art. 39, § 7(b); id. art. 42, § 
6; id. art. 51, § 1. 
 125. See 2011 NFL CBA art. 70, § 9. 
 126. See Merk, 945 F.2d at 894; Rupcich, 833 F.3d at 855. 
 127. Rupcich, 833 F.3d at 855. 
 128. 2016 NFL Substance Abuse Policy, § 4.1; NFL PES § 9.  In his motion to vacate the 
arbitration award, Johnson further argued that these policies combined required the NFL and NFLPA to 
retain separate arbitrators for each policy, meaning that none of the arbitrators retained for one policy 
can also be arbitrators for the other policy. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of his Refiled Motion to 
Vacate Arbitration Award at 6 n.10, Johnson v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 5:17-cv-00047 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2017).  Nothing in the plain text of the Policies supports this allegation. See 
generally 2016 NFL Substance Abuse Policy; see also 2016 NFL PES.  Nevertheless, retaining only two 
arbitrators for the two policies combined would still breach the plain text of both policies.  2016 NFL 
Substance Abuse Policy, § 4.1; NFL PES, § 9. 
 129. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 17. 
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arbitrators available to hear these appeals may inconvenience players or 
raise the possibility of an unresolved conflict of interest, neither of these 
events happened in either the Johnson or Pennel cases, and the modification 
did not go nearly so far as to take away the players’ grievance rights 
completely.130 
At the same time, some of the other modifications alleged by Johnson 
may indeed go as far as to affect the players’ fundamental rights of appeal 
granted to them in the drug testing policies.131  In his complaint, Johnson 
alleged that when he requested “any other testing laboratory ‘protocols’ 
referenced in the Policy . . . that were applicable to the testing of samples 
such as the testing that was done of the sample provided by Johnson,” the 
NFL refused to provide that information, possibly due to a discovery-related 
side deal made with the NFLPA.132  Presumably, Johnson could then use 
this information to challenge any possible procedural deficiencies with the 
testing process, giving him a weapon beyond simply trying to show that he 
did not actually test positive for a banned substance. 
While the likelihood of success of such a claim seems fairly tenuous, it 
is important to remember that in 2012, professional baseball players Ryan 
Braun and Eliezer Alfonzo had drug suspensions overturned on appeal 
based on successful arguments that laboratory protocols regarding the chain 
of custody of the testing samples were flawed and handled incorrectly.133  
 
 130. See Amended Complaint, supra note 5 at 40-41 (showing that Johnson argued, in his 
amended complaint, that the arbitrator in his appeal, James Carter of Wilmer Hale, had a conflict of 
interest due to his firm’s previous dealings with the NFL).  Indeed, former FBI Director Robert S. 
Mueller was retained to investigate the NFL’s conduct in handling Ray Rice’s domestic abuse 
allegations while he was a partner at Wilmer Hale. Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
to Vacate Arbitration Award at 4, Johnson v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 5:17-cv-00047 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2017).  However, according to the NFL and NFLPA Johnson did not object to 
Carter’s service as arbitrator at the time of the hearing, and thus his objection in this lawsuit to Carter’s 
placement as arbitrator is likely barred.  Id. at 16; see Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 495 Fed.App’x. 
894, 898 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Garfield & Co. v. Wiest, 432 F.2d 849, 853 (2d Cir. 1970)).  “It is 
well settled that disgruntled losers cannot first raise their objections after an award has been made.” Id.  
It is worth noting that Johnson disagrees with the NFL and NFLPA’s claim that he has waived this 
objection; he argued in a reply brief that the issues he raised with the arbitrator selection process and the 
fact that the NFL and NFLPA allegedly held information about this process from him at the outset of the 
selection of Carter as arbitrator keeps intact his objection at the litigation stage.  Plaintiff’s Reply to 
Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award at 14-17, 
Johnson v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 5:17-cv-00047 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2017). 
 131. See generally Amended Complaint, supra note 5 (indicating that the NFL’s modification may 
have affected Johnson’s fundamental rights). 
 132. Id. at 17. 
 133. Adam McCalvy, Braun Wins Appeal of 50-Game Suspension, MLB.COM (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://m.mlb.com/news/article/26813960/; Barry M. Bloom, MLB Lifts 100-Game Suspension for 
Alfonzo, MLB.COM (May 14, 2012), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/31248778/.  It is also notable—
though perhaps not relevant to the Johnson case—that the arbitrator who overturned both Braun and 
Alfonzo’s appeals, Shyam Das, was named as the NFL’s third appeals arbitrator shortly after Pennel 
filed his lawsuit. Id; see Letter from Adolpho A. Birch III, Sr. Vice President of Labor Policy & League 
Affairs, NFL Management Council, & Tom DePaso, General Counsel, NFL Players Association, to 
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Johnson may or may not have been able to make a similar successful 
argument had he been provided the information he requested.  The fact 
remains that he, or any other player filing a hybrid § 301/duty of fair 
representation claim, would still have to prove that they would have won the 
arbitration hearing but for the union’s breach of duty, which is extremely 
difficult to prove.134  But the fact that Johnson was denied this information 
relatively shows that the “side deals” did affect his attorneys’ ability to do 
their due diligence while defending their client.135 
Therefore, the mere existence of these side deals—along with their 
clearly clandestine nature—raises serious questions about what else may 
have been modified by the NFL and the NFLPA without the knowledge of 
the NFLPA membership body.  If, for example, the NFLPA agreed in one 
of these side deals to “go easy” on the NFL in certain cases to gain ground 
for more high-profile players, this would show a discriminatory action that 
would be a clear breach of the duty of fair representation.136  Or if the 
NFLPA agreed to change a more fundamental term of the drug policy that 
affects the players on more subtle grounds and refused to tell players about 
this change—even when asked—this conduct could easily be considered to 
be “so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ . . .  as to be rational.”137  
 
Arbitrator Shyam Das (Dec. 1, 2016) (on file with author); see also Defendants’ Status Report at 1, 
Pennel v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 1:16-cv-02889 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2016).  MLB 
removed Das as the league’s independent arbitrator shortly after Das issued the Braun and Alfonzo 
decisions, while “vehemently disagree[ing]” with Das’s reasoning.  Bob Nightengale, MLB Fires 
Longtime Arbitrator Shyam Das, 
USA TODAY (May 14, 2012), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/dailypitch/post/2012/05/shyam-
das-mlb-arbitrator-fired-ryan-braun/1. 
 134. See Wood v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 807 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 1986) (“With respect to 
conduct apart from the arbitration, the Union is liable for damages only if its breach was a ‘but-for’ 
cause of those damages.”).; see also Anderson v. United Paperworkers Int’l. Union,  641 F.2d 574, 580 
n. 8 (8th Cir. 1981) (“In a number of recent cases, courts have held unions not liable for breaches of their 
duty of fair representation absent evidence that but for the union’s conduct the employee would not have 
been injured.”) (citing Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 552 F.2d 1005, 1017-20 (3rd Cir. 1977); 
Self v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union 61, 620 F.2d 439, 443 (4th Cir. 
1980); Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 1978); De Arroyo v. Sindicato 
De Trabajoderes Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 290 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 
(1970)); see also Rupcich, 833 F.3d at 856-58 (finding that the plaintiff’s abandoned case was much 
stronger than another case that the union recently took to arbitration; and thus, “a reasonable juror could 
find . . . that had [the union] followed its CBA-mandated grievance procedure and proceeded to 
arbitration, [the plaintiff] would have probably prevailed in getting her job back”).  However, if the 
player can show that they could not explore the possibility of a breach of protocol because of a secret 
side deal between the union and league that denied them access to the required information, then the 
“national labor policy” disfavoring such deals may overrule the strong deference granted to unions by 
the courts in these situations.  See Local 509, ILGWU, 65 L.R.R.M. at 10-11. 
 135. See Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that in 
the “few cases involving nondisclosure of evidence or perjury” in arbitration hearings, “courts have 
recognized the applicability of the due diligence requirement.”). 
 136. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190 (citation omitted). 
 137. Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 499 U.S. at 67; see Ruzicka, 649 F.2d at 1211 n.3. 
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At this time such an analysis is mere speculation; it remains unknown as to 
what evidence of any other “side deals” may be uncovered in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Over a half-century of case law has made it clear: it is extremely 
difficult to prove that a union breached their duty of fair representation, as 
the courts give unions extreme deference in their actions.  However, as this 
article has shown, the NFLPA could be at risk of breaching their duty based 
on the secret oral side deals they have entered into with the NFL to change 
certain elements of the collectively bargained drug testing policies without 
going through the proper channels. 
Although the side deals that have become public are still fairly innocent 
in nature, it is unknown whether the language changed is anywhere close to 
“fundamental” enough for the NFLPA to be at risk of facing any liability.138  
But there is still much that is unknown.  As more details continue to 
emerge, the NFL players that make up the NFLPA’s membership may start 
to take a hard look at what exactly their union is doing for them.  If other 
disgruntled players pick up on what Pennel and Johnson have discovered 
and subsequently discover more “side deals” beyond what has been 
revealed already, the NFLPA could be facing battles on two separate fronts 
in the coming years.  As professional football faces the likelihood of yet 
another lockout when the CBA expires in 2021, the NFLPA will have to 
make some challenging decisions on how exactly they want to represent 
their membership bodies not only in publicly scrutinized collective 
bargaining negotiations but also in secret “side” negotiations.139 
 
 
 138. See Rupcich, 833 F.3d at 855 (noting that side arrangements can be “unenforceable as a 
matter of law”). 
 139. See Laurel Pfahler, Bengals’ Winston: Players ‘Need to be Ready’ for 2021 Work Stoppage, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.daytondailynews.com/sports/bengals-winston-
players-need-ready-for-2021-work-stoppage/lx2ioCchShT5IApHFfQ10I/; Jeremy Fowler, Ramon Foster 
Expects 2021 Work Stoppage Over Drug Policy, ESPN.COM (Aug. 22, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/17366384/pittsburgh-steelers-player-rep-nfl-players-save-2021-
lockout; David Steele, Another NFL Lockout inevitable as long as Owners Keep Ripping Off Players, 
SPORTING NEWS (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/news/nfl-lockout-owners-players-
money-labor-contract-arbitration/1q04k1rg8pdxp1b134yfqh4ib5. 
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